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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution, in Article III, Section 2, in providing that the
judicial power of the United States "shall extend to all Cases in Law
and Equity," of certain defined categories, recognizes the distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity. Amendment VII empha-
sizes the distinction by providing that "In suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved," and so on. In an early
case' the Supreme Court pointed out that the acts of Congress had
distinguished between remedies at common law and equity, and
that to effectuate the purposes of the legislature, "the remedies in
the courts of the United States are to be, at common law or in
equity, not according to the practice of state courts, but according
to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and
defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of
these principles." This statement has been quoted and emphasized
many times.2
Again, the Supreme Court has said that "the equity jurisdiction
conferred on the federal courts is the same as that which the High
Court of Chancery in England possesses." 3 The remedies available
are those which had been devised and were being administered by
the English High Court of Chancery at the time of the separation
of the countries.4 Following English precedents, the Judiciary Act
* Of the law firm of Ohlinger, Koles, Wolf, & Flues, Toledo, Ohio.
'Robinson v. Campbell, 3 Wheat. 212 (U.S. 1818).
2 Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669 (U.S. 1850); Thompson v. Cen-
tral Ohio R.R., 6 Wall. 134 (U.S. 1868); Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521
(1932).
3 Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202 (1893).
4 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1939)
(187)
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of 1789 provided that "suits in Equity shall not be sustained in either
of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate
and complete remedy may be had at law."5
Upon the historical foundation so often referred to by the Su-
preme Court we erected our federal judicial edifice. The building
was separated into two compartments by a dead wall extending
from the basement to the roof. On one side of the wall was the
compartment labelled "law," and on the other the compartment
designated "equity," and for 126 years, until the Act of March 3,
1915,8 there was no means of intercommunication between the two
compartments. The suitor who mistakenly entered the wrong com-
partment was forcibly ejected, and was obliged to reframe his
pleadings and enter the proper compartment from the outside.'
The procedure at law was required by various process acts to
be the same as that used in the supreme courts of the various states
in which federal courts were held,8 and finally the Conformity Act
required, generally, that it conform "as near as may be, to the
practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing at
the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State in which
such district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary not-
withstanding."' ,
For suits in equity the Supreme Court prescribed, from time
to time, its Equity Rules.1"
This dual system caused confusion. In 1848 New York adopted
the Field Code of Procedure. Many western states enacted codes
modeled largely after the Field Code, while others, notably Illinois
and Michigan, preserved the procedural distinction between law
and equity and the forms of common law pleading. In requiring
conformity "as near as may be" - a phrase upon which every fed-
eral court, in time, exercised its dialectics - the Conformity Act
added to the confusion of practice.
About the year 1910, the American Bar Association undertook
the study of this situation and the possible means of remedying it.
Its Committee on Uniform Procedure prepared a bill authorizing
the Supreme Court to prescribe by general rules for the district
S1 STAT. 73 (1789), 28 U.S.C. §384 (1940).
838 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U.S.C. §397 (1940).
Thompson v. Central R.R., 6 Wall. 134 (U.S. 1868).
8 Temporary Process Act, Act of Sept. 29, 1789, 1 STAT. 93; Permanent
Process Act of May 8, 1792, 1 STAT. 275; Process Act of May 8, 1792, 4 STAT.
278, providing for federal courts in states admitted since 1789; Act of August
1, 1842, 5 STAT. 499, extending the provisions of the Process Act of 1828
to courts of the United States held in states admitted since 1828.
9 Conformity Act of June 1, 1872, 17 STAT. 197.
10First Equity Rules, 7 Wheat. 5 (U.S. 1822); Equity Rules of 1842;
Equity Rules, 1866-1911; Equity Rules, 1912; see HopKiNs, FEDERAL EQurry
RuLEs ANNOTATEm (8th ed. 1933).
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courts the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in actions at law. For fourteen years, the
bill, or one similar to it, was introduced in every session of Con-
gress, but in every session it failed of passage either because of
active opposition or by reason of lack of interest. n 1927 there was
added to the bill a section giving the Supreme Court the power to
unite the general rules prescribed by it for suits in equity with
those in actions at law. The Senate committee reported the bill
favorably, but it died in the Judiciary Committee of the House.1'
All these efforts of the American Bar Association proving un-
availing, the committee, in 1930, recommended that the Association
"cease to press this bill by general agitation all over the country,"
but that it confine itself to having the bill introduced regularly in
Congress and to keeping in touch with it.12 Then, in 1934, the bill,
in substantially the same form in which it had been introduced in
1927, was again introduced, and with the backing of the new ad-
ministration, passed both houses of Congress and became a law on
June 19, 1934.13
On June 3, 1935, the Supreme Court announced that pursuant
to Section 2 of the Act it would "undertake the preparation of a
unified system of general rules for cases in equity and actions at
law" in the district courts of the United States, "so as to secure
one form of civil action and procedure for both classes of cases,
while maintaining inviolate the right of trial by jury in accordance
with the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States and without altering substantive rights." To assist it in this
undertaking the Court appointed an Advisory Committee made up
of eminent practitioners and teachers of law.14
The Committee prepared and submitted to the bar in May,
1936, and in April and November, 1937, drafts of the rules proposed
by it. The final draft was adopted by the Supreme Court on De-
cember 20, 1937, and the Chief Justice was directed to transmit the
proposed rules to the Attorney General with the request that he
report them to Congress at the beginning of its regular session in
January, 1938. This was done, and in accordance with the terms of
the Enabling Act the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect
after the close of the session on September 16, 1938.
On November 6, 1939, the Supreme Court requested the Ad-
visory Committee to prepare and submit to the Court such amend-
ments as they might deem advisable, 5 and on January 5, 1942, it
1"52 A.B.A. REP. 396-401 (1927).
1255 A.B.A. REP. 91 (1930).
1348 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. §723b, c (1940).
"295 U.S. 774 (1935).
'r 308 U.S. 641 (1939).
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ordered that the surviving members of the Advisory Committee, or
so many of them as would be willing to serve, "be designated as a
continuing Advisory Committee to advise the Court with respect
to proposed amendments or additions to the Rules."'" This was
very necessary. In the years since the Rules went into effect the
courts- the Supreme Court, the circuit courts of appeals and the
district courts -have handed down almost 10,000 reported opinions
construing and interpreting the Rules. Following the Court's order,
the Advisory Committee studied the operation of the Rules and
published reports of proposed 'amendments in May 1944, May 1945,
and June 1946. Amendments covering 33 of the original 86 rules
were adopted by the Supreme Court,'7 and were reported to the
Eightieth Congress at the opening of the first regular session begin-
ning on January 3, 1947. They went into effect three months after
the adjournment of that sessibn,18 or on March 19, 1948.
POLICY OF THE RULES
The Rules govern the procedure in the district courts of the
United States "in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as
cases at law or in equity."'" Their general policy requires that a
cause be adjudicated on the merits, and that technicalities of pro-
cedure and form be not allowed to determine the rights of liti-
gants.20 The time is past, it has been said, when inadvertent or
technical failures, or omissions that can be supplied, will wreck
the right decision and a case,2' and courts have warned that we
should no longer look upon a lawsuit "as if it were in the nature of
a cockfight so that the litigant who wishes to succeed must try and
get an advocate who is a game bird with the best pluck and sharp-
est spurs";22 and that the Rules have superseded "the sporting
theory of justice."2 -
16 314 U.S. 720 (1942).
17 The amendments adopted relate to the following rules and sub-
divisions: 6 (b), (c); 7 (a); 12 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h); 13 (a),
(g), (i); 14 (a); 17 (b); 24 (a), (b); 26 (a), (b); 27 (a), (b); 28 (a); 33;
34; 36 (a); 41 (a), (b); 45 (b), (d); 52 (a); 54 (b); 56 (a), (c); 58; 59 (b),
(e); 60 (a), (b); 62 (b), (h); 65 (c); 66; 68; 73 (a), (g); 75 (a), (b), (d),
(g), (h), (m), (n), (o); 77 (d); 79 (a), (b), (c), (d); 80 (a), (b); 81
(a), (c), (f); 84; 86 (b). Amendments proposed by the Committee to the
following rules were not adopted: 25 (a); 30 (b); 50 (a), (b).
is See House Concurrent Resolution 127 (Dec. 19, 1947).
19 Rule 1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. following §723
(1940).
20Victory v. Manning, 128 F. 2d 415 (C.C.A. 3d 1942).
21 Knutson v. Metallic Slab Form Co., 132 F. 2d 231 (C.C.A. 5th 1942).
2 2Barnett v. Jaspan, 124 F. 2d 1005 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
23 Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F. 2d 976, 996 (C.C.A. 2d 1942).
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PLEADINGS
In 1808 Mr. Joseph Chitty published in London his famous
work on Pleading. By the year 1851 it had gone through eleven
American editions. Together with Blackstone's Commentaries it
provided the basic training for lawyers for the greater part of the
last century.
Mr. Chitty defines pleading in the following terms:
Pleading is the statement in a logical and legal form
of the facts which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action,
or the defendant's ground' of defense; it is the formal mode
of alleging that on the record, which would be the support
of the action or the defense of the party in evidence....
The grand object contemplated by the system is the pro-
duction of a certain and material issue between the parties,
upon some important part of the subject-matter of dispute
between them.24
Bates, which is the Bible of the Ohio pleader, says:
There must be pleadings and an issue made up by
them.25
But the quest for an issue frequently defeated justice, and the
Supreme Court, in a recent case, commented that under the former
practice the function of issue formulation was performed "primarily
and inadequately by the pleadings. '2
The Rules, the Court said, "restrict the pleadings to the task of
general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in the preparation for trial."
It is a question, however, whether this statement does not go
too far. Loose pleading and mere notice-giving may be just as pro-
ductive of delays and uncertainties as the quest for an issue. Cer-
21CHITTY, PLEADING 213 (11th Am. ed. 1851) (emphasis supplied).
2
5 BATES, PLEADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES, AND FoRIus 147 (3d ed. 1923)
(emphasis supplied).26 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). It is interesting to note that
as long ago as 1713, that genius of satire, Jonathan Swift, had ridiculed the
system:
But, with rejoinders or replies,
Long bills and answers stuffed with lies,
Demur, imparlance, and assoign,
The parties ne'er could issue join:
For sixteen years the cause was spun,
And then stood where it first begun.
Cadenus and Vanessa.
It was even worse in 1852 when Charles Dickens, in Bleak House,
satirized the case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce "with its bills, cross-bills,
answers, rejoinders, and the mountains of costly nonsense that had ac-
cumulated on it." Meanwhile, as Dickens says, innumerable children had
been born into the cause; innumerable young people had married into it;
innumerable old people had died out of it-and no one knew what the cause
was about or who the real parties were; no one had ever seen them.
1948]
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tainly a person or corporation brought before a federal court is
entitled to know the claim asserted by the opposing party, and
should not be compelled to search through a mass of depositions to
ascertain on just what theory the controversy will be submitted
f or adjudicationY.2
The only pleadings now permitted are those (1) which set forth
claims for relief, whether original claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims, or third-party claims; (2) answers thereto; and (3) replies
to counterclaims "denominated as such." No other pleadings are
allowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a
third-party answer.28
Certain defenses may be made by motion, namely: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over
the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5)
insufficiency of service of process; (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted; and now, by amendment, (7) failure
to join an indispensable party.29
Rule 12 (b), as originally adopted, was construed by the ma-
jority of courts as not permitting "speaking motions," that is, mo-
tions to dismiss for failure to state a claim supported by affidavits
and other evidence.2 Other courts held that such extraneous evi-
dence was proper, and treated the motion to dismiss, with its ac-
companying evidence, as a motion for summary judgment under
Rule 56.21 This latter practice has now been approved by amend-
ment2 2 A similar change has been made in subdivision (c), Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings. 33
Probably no part of the Rules as originally adopted has caused
the spilling of so much judicial ink as the first sentence of Sub-
division (e). It originally read:
27 It is to be noted that Mr. Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion,
does not touch upon the function of pleadings under the Rules. His
opinion is devoted to the practical trial aspects of giving the processes of
discovery the scope which plaintiff sought. Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined
in Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion.
28 Rule 7 (a), as amended, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.
following §723 (1940).
29 Rule 12 (b), as amended.
30 Cohen v. United States, 129 F. 2d 733 (C.C.A. 8th 1942); Carroll v.
Morrison Hotel Corp., 149 F. 2d 404 (C.C.A. 7th 1945); Kuhn v. Pacific
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. N.Y. 1941); Boro Hall Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 37 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. N.Y. 1941); Monjar v. Higgins,
39 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. N.Y. 1941): Snowhite v. Tide Water Associated Oil
Co., 40 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. N.J. 1941).
31 Central Mexico Light and Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F. 2d 85, 87
(C.C.A. 2d 1940); Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F. 2d 90 (C.C.A. 3d 1941); Victory
v. Manning, 128 F. 2d 415 (C.C.A. 3d 1942).
32Rule 12 (b), as amended.
-Rule 12 (c), as amended.
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Before responding to a pleading, or, if no responsive
pleading is permitted by these rules, within 20 days after
the service of the pleading upon him, a party may move for
a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any
matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to prepare his respon-
sive pleading or to prepare for trial.
Many courts took it upon themselves to eliminate the words "to
prepare for trial," confining the application of the motion to plead-
ings which were not sufficiently definite to enable the movant "to
prepare his responsive pleading. 3 4 A minority, with better reason,
applied the rule as it stood, and granted the motion where the
pleading was not sufficiently definite to enable a party "to prepare
for trial."3 The subdivision, as amended, now limits the motion to
the purpose of pleading.3 8
EXTENSION OF DEPOSITION-DISCOVERY PRACTICE
Rule 26 (a), as amended, as distinguished from the rule as it
originally stood, now permits a defendant to proceed at once, upon
the commencement of the action, and without leave of court, to
serve his notices and to take depositions.3 7
To subdivision (b) there has been added this sentence:
It is not ground for objection that the testimony will
be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.3 8
The subdivision, as amended, also establishes the scope of examina-
tion under Rule 33, Interrogatories to Parties, Rule 34, Discovery
and Production of Documents and Things for Inspection, Copying,
or Photographing, and Rule 45 (d), Subpoena for Taking Deposi-
tions, because all these other rules and subdivisions refer back to
it. The only limitations in the rule are (1) that the matter sought
relates to the claim or defense of the examining party, and (2)
that it be "not privileged."
What is the scope of the term "privilege" under this subdivi-
sion?
The Supreme Court answered this question in Hickman v. Tay-
31 See, for example: Kuhn v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp.
100 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); Fleming v. Mason and Dixon Lines, 42 F. Supp. 230
(E.D. Tenn. 1941).
35 See, for example: Fleming v. Enterprise Box Co., 36 F. Supp. 607
(S.D. Fla. 1940); Fleming v. Dierks Lumber and Coal Co., 39 F. Supp. 237
(W.D. Ark. 1941); Carcelli v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 47 F.
Supp. 433 (W.D. Pa. 1942).88Rule 12 (e), as amended.
37 Rule 26 (a), as amended.
38 Rule 26 (b), as amended.
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lor,39 a case which may well go down as promulgating the lawyer's
bill of rights. The action was one for injuries arising from the
death of a member of the crew of a tug caused by the sinking of
the tug. The tug owners employed Mr. Fortenbaugh, an attorney,
to defend the action, and he interviewed persons who he believed
had knowledge of the accident, and in some cases he made memo-
randa of what they told him. The plaintiff thereafter filed inter-
rogatories. One of these read:
State whether any statements of the members of the
crews of the Tugs 'J. M. Taylor' and 'Philadelphia' or of
any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing
of the car afloat and the sinking of the Tug 'John M. Tay-
lor.' Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements in
writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions
of any such oral statements or reports.
The tug owners admitted that statements had been taken, but
declined to summarize or set forth the contents on the ground that
plaintiff's requests called for "privileged matter obtained in prepa-
ration for litigation" and constituted "an attempt to obtain indi-
rectly counsel's private file." They claimed that answering these
requests "would involve practically turning over not only the com-
plete files, but also the telephone records, and almost, the thoughts
of counsel."
The district court held that the requested matters were not
privileged and ordered that the tug owners and Mr. Fortenbaugh,
as counsel and agent for the tug owners, forthwith "answer Plain-
tiff's 38th interrogatory and supplemental interrogatories; produce
all written statements of witnesses obtained by Mr. Fortenbaugh as
counsel and agent for Defendants; state in substance any fact con-
cerning this case which Defendants learned through oral statements
made by witnesses to Mr. Fortenbaugh whether or not included in
his private memoranda and produce Mr. Fortenbaugh's memoranda
containing statements of fact by witnesses or to submit these memo-
randa to the Court for determination of those portions which should
be revealed to Plaintiff." Upon their refusal, the court adjudged
them in contempt and ordered them imprisoned until they com-
plied.
The circuit court of appeals reversed the judgment of the dis-
trict court, and its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the memoranda and statements
demanded were not within the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and that they were not protected on that basis. They did, however,
fall outside the arena of permissible discovery in that they con-
travened "the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and
defense of legal claims." The court went on:
39 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is
bound to work for the advancement of justice while faith-
fully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In per-
forming his various duties, however, it is essential that a
lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their coun-
sel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he
assemble the information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and
plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.
That is the historical and the necessary way in which law-
yers act within the framework of our system of juris-
prudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' in-
terests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental im-
pressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways - aptly though roughly termed by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in this case as the "work product of
the lawyer." Were such material open to opposing counsel
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing
would remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, hereto-
fore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfair-
ness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the
giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for
trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoral-
izing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of
justice would be poorly served.
We do not mean to say that all written materials ob-
tained or prepared by an adversary's counsel are necessarily
free from discovery in all cases. Where relevant and non-
privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and
wheie production of these facts is essential to the prepara-
tion of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such
written statements and documents might, under certain cir-
cumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to
the existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might
be useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration.
And production might be justified where the witnesses are
no longer available or can be reached only with difficulty.
Were production of written statements and documents to be
precluded under such circumstances, the liberal ideals of
the deposition-discovery portions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would be stripped of much of their mean-
ing. But the general policy against invading the privacy
of an attorney's course of preparation is so well recognized
and so essential to an orderly working of our system of
legal procedure that a burden rests on the one who would
invade that privacy to establish adequate reasons to justify
production through a subpoena or court order. That burden,
we believe, is necessarily implicit in the rules as now con-
stituted."
4 0 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
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LIIUTATIONS OF TIME
In Bronson v. Schulten, decided in 1881, the Supreme Court
said:
In this country all courts have terms or vacations.
The time of the commencement of every term, if there be
half a dozen a year, is fixed by statute, and the end of it
by the final adjournment of the court for that term. This
is the case with regard to all the courts of the United
States, and if there be exceptions in the State courts, they
are unimportant. It is a general rule of law that all thejudgments, decrees, or other orders of the courts, however
conclusive in their character, are under the control of the
court which pronounces them during the term at which
they are rendered or entered of record, and they may then
be set aside, vacated, modified, or annulled by that court.
But it is a rule equally well established, that after the
term has ended all final judgments and decrees of the court
pass beyond its control, unless steps be taken during that
term, by motion or otherwise, to set aside, modify, or cor-
rect them; and if errors exist, they can only be corrected
by such proceeding by a writ of error or appeal as may be
allowed in a court which, by law, can review the decision.
So strongly has this principle been upheld by this court,
that while realizing there is no court which can review its
decisions, it has invariably refused all applications for re-
hearing made after the adjournment of the court for the
term at which the judgment was rendered. And this is
placed upon the ground that the case has passed beyond the
control of the court.
This is the rule in Ohio, and the rule has in no way been regulated
or abridged by statute.4 2
Rule 6 (a) empowers the court, for cause shown, to enlarge the
time fixed in the rules for doing certain things, and subdivision (b)
of the rules, as originally adopted, said that "the period of time pro-
vided for the doing of any act is not affected or limited by the ex-
piration of a term of court." The subdivision has now been amended
by the insertion of the words "continued existence or" before the
word "expiration." The final sentence of the subdivision, as amended,
now reads:
The continued existence or expiration of a term of court
in no way affects the power of a court to do any act or take
any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending
before it.43 (Italics supplied.)
41Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410 (1881); see also Exporters v.
Butterworth-Judson Co., 258 U.S. 365 (1922); Delaware L. & W. R.R., v.
Rellstab, 276 U.S. 1 (1928); Realty Acceptance Corp. v. Montgomery, 284
U.S. 547 (1932).
42 Martinka v. Cleveland R.R., 133 Ohio St. 359, 13 N.E. 2d 910 (1938).
43Rule 6 (b), as amended.
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This practically eliminates, so far as the district courts are con-
cerned, the old concept of terms of court, and limits the power of
courts to do certain things to stated periods of time, regardless of
terms. Thus under subdivision (a) the times limited in Rule 25,
Substitution of Parties, Rule 50 (b), the time prescribed for filing
a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Rule 52 (b),
the time for making a motion to amend the findings of the court,
Rule 59 (b), (d), (e), time limits for motion for new trial, for
order for new trial sua sponte and for motion to alter or amend
the judgment, Rule 60 (b), motion to correct mistakes, and Rule
73 (a), the time for filing the record on appeal and for docketing
the appeal, cannot be enlarged by a district court except to the ex-
tent and under the conditions stated in these rules; the fact that the
term of court has not expired does not permit the court to enlarge
the time.
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT; MOTION FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V. IN
ACCORDANCE WITH MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
No change has been made in Rule 50 (a) and (b) which deal
with motions for directed verdict and reservation of decision
thereon.41
Here attention must be directed to the importance of the mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under federal prac-
tice. In the practice of some states it is sufficient to make a motion
for a directed verdict after the close of all the evidence. If the mo-
tion is erroneously denied, the reviewing court must enter the judg-
ment which the trial court should have rendered.45
Under Rule 50 (b) the motion for a directed verdict is not, in
itself, sufficient to require the reviewing court to render final judg-
ment; a party who has moved for a directed verdict must also,
within 10 days after the reception of the verdict, "move to have the
verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have
judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict"; otherwise the reviewing court cannot enter final judgment,
but can only reverse and remand for further proceedings.
4 6
4+The amendments submitted by the Advisory Committee were not
adopted by the Supreme Court. See: REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS,
June, 1946; Amendments adopted by the Supreme Court, December 27,
1946.
-
5 Metzger Seed & Oil Co. v. Berg, 84 Ohio St. 485, 95 N.E. 1152 (1911);
Sobolovitz v. Oil Co., 107 Ohio St. 204, 140 N.E. 634 (1923); Riley v. Com-
missioners, 109 Ohio St. 29, 141 N.E. 656 (1923); Majoros v. Cleveland In-
terurban R.R., 127 Ohio St. 255, 187 N.E. 857 (1933).46 Cone v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947); Globe
Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571 (1948).
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MOTION FOR DisMissAL IN ACTION TRIED BY COURT
Rule 41 (b) provides, in part:
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move
for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
This general provision, by its terms, applies both to cases tried by
a jury, and to cases tried by the court, and some courts have held
that the motion is the equivalent of a motion for a directed verdict
under Rule 50 (a), with this difference, namely, that a motion for
a directed verdict under the latter rule must "state the specific
grounds therefor," while a motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (b)
need only state the ground "that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. ' 47 Other courts have held
that the motion to dismiss is not the equivalent of a motion for a
directed verdict; that upon a motion to dismiss the court is not
confined to a consideration of whether plaintiff has made a prima
facie case, but may make findings upon the evidence, which must
be accepted by the reviewing court unless "clearly erroneous."4 8
This confusion has been partly, though not entirely, cleared up
by the following sentences inserted in subdivision (b):
In an action tried by the court without a jury the court
as trier of the facts may then determine them and renderjudgment against the plaintiff or decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court
renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52 (a)."
Different consideration must apply to jury and non-jury cases.
In a jury case the court may not make findings and direct a verdict,
even though upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff the court
would be justified in finding against him, or could, in its discretion,
grant a motion for a new trial, if the jury found in plaintiff's
favor50
The sentences added by amendment recognize the power of the
court, in a non-jury case to make findings and to render judgment
47 Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mason, 115 F. 2d 548 (C.C.A. 3d 1940);
Shaw v. Missouri P.R.R., 36 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. La. 1941); Maryland Gas
Co. v. Sauers, 38 F. Supp. 656 (W.D. Pa. 1941).
4 8 Gary Theatre Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F. 2d 891 (C.C.A.
7th 1941); Barr v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 149 F. 2d 634 (C.C.A. 9th
1945); Young v. United States, 111 F. 2d 823 (C.C.A. 9th 1940).4 9 Rule 41 (b), as amended.
50 Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943); Bailey v.
Central Vermont R.R., 319 U.S. 350 (1943); De Zon v. American President
Lines, Inc., 318 U.S. 660 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
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against the plaintiff. Of course, findings are not necessary if the
motion to dismiss is denied.
But for a case tried by a jury the motion for a directed verdict,
with all that it implies, and with all the restrictions upon the
granting of such a motion which have been developed under the
guaranty of jury trial contained in the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution, still applies.
CAPACITY OF RECEIVERS
Rule 17 (b), relative to capacity to sue or be sued, has had
added to it the provision:
That the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of
the United States to sue or be sued in a court of the United
States is governed by Rule 66.
Rule 66 has been amended to include the following:
A receiver shall have the capacity to sue in any dis-
trict court without ancillary appointment; ...
It has long been the law that the courts of the several states
are foreign to each other.2 This is also true of the district courts
of the several districts, and before the adoption of the Rules a re-
ceiver appointed in another state or by the court of another district
was without capacity to sue or be sued in a foreign district court."
Rule 17 (b), by providing generally that "capacity to sue or be sued
shall be determined by the law of the state in which the district
court is held," enabled a receiver appointed in a foreign state court
to sue in a district court if the law of the state in which the district
court was held vested him with capacity; 53 this, however, did not
apply to receivers appointed by the district courts of other states;
they still lacked capacity to sue or be sued in a foreign district
court;4' to vest them with capacity ancillary appointment was nec-
essary. The amendments of Rules 17 (b) and 66 now dispense
with what has been described as "the altogether idle ceremony of
ancillary appointment." 55
JUDGMENT UPON MULTIPLE CLAIMS
Rule 54 (b) has been entirely rewritten and the subdivision as
rewritten disposes of harassing uncertainties which in the past have
5"Bassett v. Massman Constr. Co., 120 F. 2d 230 (C.C.A. 8th 1941);
Horn v. Pere Marquette R.R., 151 Fed. 626, 631 (E.D. Mich. 1907); Applegate
v. Applegate, 39 F. Supp. 887, 889 (E.D. Va. 1941). •
52 Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322 (U.S. 1854); Sterrett v. Second Nat.
Bank, 248 U.S. 73 (1918); McCandless v. Furlund, 293 U.S. 67 (1934).
53 Bicknell v. Lloyd-Smith, 109 F. 2d 527 (C.C.A. 2d 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 650 (1940).
54 Kelley v. Queeney, 41 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. N.Y. 1941).
55 Bicknell v. Lloyd-Smith, supra note 53.
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troubled lawyers. The Supreme Court declared in a recent case
that "the Rules make it clear that it is 'differing occurrences or
transactions which form the basis of separate units of judicial ac-
tion'. . . If a judgment has been entered which terminates the action
as to such a claim, it is final for the purposes of appeal under Section
123 of the Judicial Code. 5 6 The difficulty lay in determining what
were "differing occurrences or transactions," and an erroneous de-
termination might result in allowing the time for appeal to pass, and
thus the opportunity for review might be lost.57 The subdivision as
amended disposes of these doubts. It reads:
JUDGMENT -PON MULTIPLE CLAIMS. When more
than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim, the court
may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more
but less than all of the claims only upon an express de-
termination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
an express direction for the entry of the judgment. In the
absence of such determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of
decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry
of judgment adjudicating all the claims.5 8
TIME FOR APPEAL- 30 DAYS
The statute provides, generally, that an appeal must be taken
"within three months after the entry of such judgment or decree."5 9
But Rule 73 (a), as amended, now provides, with certain exceptions
and provisos, that an appeal from a district court to a circuit court
of appeals must be taken within "30 days from the entry of the
judgment appealed from." Rule 77 (d) requires that "immediately
upon the entry of an order or judgment the clerk shall serve a
notice of the entry by mall in the manner provided for in Rule 5
upon every party affected thereby who is not in default for failure
to appear." The subdivision has been amended by the addition of
this sentence: "Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not
affect the time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve
a party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as
permitted in Rule 73 (a)." This disposes of a recent ruling of the
Supreme Court to the effect that a party is entitled to rely upon
the requirement that notice be given.60
5 16 Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942); see discussion in Zalkind v.
Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895 (C.C.A. 2d 1943).
57 Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F. 2d 123 (C.C.A. 5th
1939).5 8Rule 54 (b), as amended.
5945 STAT. 54 (1928), 28 U.S.C. §230 (1940).
60 Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520 (1944).
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CONCLUSION
Attention has already been directed to the policy of the Rules
and to the realistic approach which they represent to the problem of
judicial administration. Equally significant are recent decisions of
the Supreme Court restoring and applying the guaranties of free-
dom of speech and of the press, contained in the First Amendment,
to judicial proceedings, thus restricting in large measure the scope
of criminal contempt and the power of all courts, both state and
federal, to punish for such contempt.
The departure from these constitutional guaranties in cases in-
volving criticism of judicial action in pending proceedings received
its first authoritative sanction in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States,61 decided in 1918. In this case the Supreme Court, after de-
claring that the Act of 183162 and its successor act, now codified in
United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 385,63 "conferred no power not al-
ready granted and imposed no limitations not already existing," said
that the test was not whether the alleged contemptuous publication
had been made in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice, but whether such obstruction
was the "reasonable tendency" of the publication complained of. -Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented, and, as has hap-
pened in many other situations, their dissent became the law when,
in 1941, in Nye v. United States,6" the Toledo Newspaper Company
case was overruled, the court holding that the words "so near
thereto" must be given a geographical, rather than a causal
connotation.
In Gitlow v. New York6 5 the Supreme Court for the first time
declared that freedom of speech and of the press, which are pro-
tected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress, are
among the fundamental personal rights and liberties protected by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the states. This declaration became important in the cases
of Bridges v. California"6 and Pennekamp v. Florida.6 7 Both cases
61247 U.S. 402 (1918).
624 STAT. 487 (1831).
63This section provides, in part, that "The said courts (United States
courts) shall have the power . . . to punish, by fine or imprisonment, at
the discretion of the court, contempts of their authority: Provided, that
such power to punish for contempts shall not be construed to extend to
any cases except the misbehavior of any person in their presence, or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice .... " 36 STAT.
1163 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §385 (1940).
64,313 U.S. 33 (1941).
65268 U.S 652 (1925).
60314 U.S. 252 (1941).
67328 U.S. 331 (1946).
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involved sentences for contempt imposed by state courts. Apply-
ing the principle announced in the Gitlow case the court held that
the guaranties of freedom of speech and of the press imposed re-
straints upon the power of state courts, no less than upon that of
federal courts, to punish for contempt. Neither "inherent tendency"
nor "reasonable tendency", it declared, is enough to justify a re-
striction of free expression. For these tests it substituted the rule of
the "clear and present danger" cases; "the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high be-
fore utterances can be punished. ' S The court continued:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be
won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly
appraises the character of American public opinion. For it
is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although
not always wtih perfect good taste, on all public institutions.
And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the
name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably
engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect. 9
This is a realistic appraisal of the position of the judiciary in a free
society. May it always stand.
6sBridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
o9 Id. at 270.
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